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Abstract
The paper discusses the impact of longevity extension on aggregate
wealth accumulation, accounting for changes in individual behaviors as
well as changes in population age structure. It departs from the standard
literature by adopting a formulation of individual preferences that accounts
for temporal risk aversion. Human impatience is then closely related to
mortality rates and aggregate wealth accumulation appears to be much
more sensitive to demographic factors than with the traditional approach.
Illustrations are provided using historical mortality data from different
countries.
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1 Introduction
Recent human history is characterized by rapid changes in mortality that are
likely to have major economic consequences. The paper discusses the impact of
longevity extension on aggregate wealth accumulation, accounting for changes in
individual behaviors as well as changes in population age structure. As such, it
contributes to an expanding body of literature that includes Blanchard (1985),
Lee, Mason and Miller (2002 and 2003), Bloom, Canning and Graham (2003) and
Sheshinsky (2005).
The originality of the present paper is that it relies on a formulation of indi-
vidual preferences that accounts for temporal risk aversion. It therefore departs
from the mainstream literature by considering a class of preferences that is larger
than the one introduced by Yaari (1965). Instead of assuming that agents have
a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function such that a life of length T with a
consumption profile c(.) provides a utility:
Uyaari(c, T ) =
Z T
0
α(t)u(c(t))dt
it is assumed that their von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is given by:
U(c, T ) = φ
µZ T
0
α(t)u(c(t))dt
¶
(1)
where φ is an increasing function.
The function φ that enters into this formulation of individual utility has a
straightforward interpretation in terms of temporal risk aversion, or more gener-
ally, in terms of risk aversion. Individuals have positive temporal risk aversion
if and only if φ is concave (Richard, 1975). Two individuals who only differ by
their functions φ have identical ordinal preferences but different degrees of risk
aversion (Kihlstrom and Mirman, 1974). Therefore, considering specification (1)
makes it possible to study the role of risk aversion; this is clearly a natural line
of research since mortality is undoubtedly a risk.
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Accounting for temporal risk aversion is crucial for understanding life cycle
consumption smoothing of human (and therefore mortal) beings, since the com-
bination of temporal risk aversion and lifetime uncertainty generates impatience
(Bommier, 2006). The intuition is that temporally risk averse individuals ratio-
nally consume a lot when young in order to avoid the particularly bad outcome
which consists in having a life that is both short and lacking in fun. In other
words, "Carpe diem" is a rational precept for individuals with positive temporal
risk aversion.
Impatience being related to mortality, it is naturally found that mortality
decline induces changes in human impatience. Thus in addition to the various
effects that are documented in studies that are based on Yaari’s model, the present
paper highlights and calibrates a novel effect: that of a change in impatience.
The origin of this impatience effect is carefully explained in Bommier (2008).
In particular it is shown that, although there is a strong theoretical relation be-
tween mortality risks, temporal risk aversion and human impatience, it is not
necessarily true that lower mortality implies lower impatience. The story is more
complex since mortality contributes to several terms that impact human impa-
tience in opposite directions. Whether mortality decline eventually leads to an
increase or a decrease in human impatience depends on how mortality at young
ages falls compared to mortality at old ages. Thus, although the theory does un-
ambiguously support the idea that there may be a substantial impatience effect,
applications are still needed to evaluate the magnitude of this effect.
The present paper makes contributions in two directions: firstly it provides a
simple method for estimating the impact of mortality decline on aggregate wealth
accumulation when temporal risk aversion is taken into account. The method
makes it possible to break down the impact of mortality decline into several
components, reflecting aggregation, income dilution and behavioral effects. Sec-
ondly, this method is implemented with realistic historical mortality data taken
from different countries. Computations are derived with different assumptions on
individual preferences. The discussion then highlights the qualitative and quan-
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titative contributions of temporal risk aversion. It is found that accounting for
temporal risk aversion may induce a significant shift in the assessment of the
impact of mortality decline.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the life-cycle model
of individual behavior. Section 3 deals with the aggregation of individuals’ wealth.
We suggest a breakdown of the impact of mortality changes on aggregate wealth
accumulation into three components reflecting aggregating, income dilution and
impatience effects. Section 4 develops and discusses illustrations based on mor-
tality rates observed over the period 1950-2000 in different countries. Concluding
comments are set forth in Section 5.
2 Life cycle savings
2.1 Individual preferences
In order to model intertemporal choice under uncertain lifetime, one has to con-
sider preferences allowing lotteries involving lives of different lengths to be com-
pared. Since Yaari’s seminal paper, the usual strategy involves assuming that
agents are expected utility maximizers with a utility function such that a con-
sumption profile c(.) and a life of length T provides a utility:
Uyaari(c, T ) =
Z T
0
α(t)u(c(t))dt
The function u is called instantaneous utility, and α the subjective discount func-
tion. Some recent contributions (for example Halevy, 2007 and Drouhin, 2006)
did explore extensions of Yaari’s model to non expected utility maximizers but,
surprisingly, very little exploration has been achieved within the expected util-
ity framework. It is this latter approach that we adopt here: we maintain the
assumption that agents have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, but extend
4
Yaari’s model by considering that agents have a utility function of the form:
U(c, T ) = φ
µZ T
0
α(t)u(c(t))dt
¶
where φ is an increasing (but not necessarily linear) function. By normalization it
will be assumed that φ(0) = 0. The interest of dealing with such a specification is
that it makes it possible to explore the role of risk aversion. As is known from the
seminal contribution of Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), playing with the concavity
of the function φ, while holding the functions u and α unchanged, is indeed the
formal way of discussing comparative risk aversion within the expected utility
framework. The greater the concavity of the function φ the greater the agent’s
risk aversion.
The particular case considered by Yaari, where φ is linear, corresponds to
an assumption of temporal risk neutrality, or equivalently, to an assumption of
risk neutrality with respect to life duration, when defined in a way that control
for time preferences1. To highlight the consequences of assuming temporal risk
neutrality we may compare the following lotteries:
L1
⎧
⎨
⎩
(T = 40, c(t) = 1 for all t); with p = 1
2
(T = 75; c(t) = 2 for all t) ; with p = 1
2
and
L2
⎧
⎨
⎩
(T = 40, c(t) = 2 for all t); with p = 1
2
(T = 75; c(t) = 1 for all t ≤ 40 and c(t) = 2 for t > 40); with p = 1
2
In both the above lotteries, which are illustrated in Figure 1, there is a 0.5
probability of dying at age 40 and a 0.5 probability of dying at age 75. There is
also an even chance to have a low or high consumption during the 40 first years of
life. Both lotteries assume that, in the case of survival after age 40, consumption
between ages 40 and age 75 equals 2. The difference between L1 and L2 is that
1See Bommier (2006).
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bad luck in instantaneous consumption during the first part of life is associated
with bad luck in life duration in lottery L1, while it is associated with good luck
in life duration in lottery L2. It is straightforward to check that when φ is linear,
both lotteries provide the same expected utility. However, when φ is concave then
L2 is preferred to L1. When φ is concave, the individual chooses L2, the lottery
that avoids the risk of having a life which is both short and with a low level of
instantaneous consumption.
Considering temporal risk aversion is of particular interest when considering
endogenous choice of consumption under uncertain lifetime. Consider the case of
a random length of life described by a distribution of the age at death d(T ). The
expected utility associated with a consumption profile c(.) is given by:
EU(c) =
Z +∞
0
d(T )φ
µZ T
0
α(t)u(c(t))
¶
dt (2)
When mortality is exogenous, an agent’s rational behavior involves choosing the
consumption profile that maximizes EU(c) among those affordable given his bud-
get constraints.
Similarly to what is done in Yaari (1965), an alternative formulation of ex-
pected utility can be obtained after integrating (2) by parts. Denoting s(t) =
1−
R t
0
d(T )dT , the survival function, the following is obtained
EU(c) =
∙
−s(T )φ
µZ T
0
α(t)u(c(t))
¶¸+∞
0
+
Z +∞
0
s(t)α(t)u(c(t))φ0
µZ t
0
α(τ)u(c(τ))dτ
¶
dt
and then
EU(c) =
Z +∞
0
s(t)α(t)u(c(t))φ0
µZ t
0
α(τ)u(c(τ))dτ
¶
dt (3)
In the case where φ is linear (i.e. when φ0 is a constant) one can recognize Yaari’s
formulation of expected utility which is taken as the starting point for most (if
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not all) papers that discuss the impact of mortality decline. However, when φ is
not linear, equation (3) makes it appear an endogenous discount function, which
generates a strong relation between mortality, risk aversion and impatience. We
refer to Bommier (2008) for a detailed discussion of such a relation. Below we will
only explore the consequences when agents maximize their expected utility under
specific budget constraints involving exogenous mortality patterns and perfect
intertemporal markets.
2.2 Life cycle behavior
Assume that a survival function s(t) and an age specific income profile y(t) are
exogenously given. Assume also that intertemporal markets are perfect. In pres-
ence of a perfect annuity market the return on individual’s wealth is the sum of
the rate of interest, denoted r, and the mortality rate, −s
0(t)
s(t) . Thus, individual’s
wealth has the following dynamic:
w0(t) =
µ
r − s
0(t)
s(t)
¶
w(t) + y(t)− c(t) (4)
We assume that individuals have no initial wealth. The budget constraints im-
pose:
w(0) = 0 and w(∞) ≥ 0 (5)
Form (4) and (5) the budget constraint can be rewritten in its integral form:
Z +∞
0
s(t)c(t)e−rtdt ≤
Z +∞
0
s(t)y(t)e−rtdt (6)
Rational consumers aim at maximizing their expected utility:
EU(c) =
Z +∞
0
d(T )φ
µZ T
0
α(t)u(c(t))dt
¶
dT (7)
under the constraint (6).
The first order conditions are:
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α(t)u0(c(t))
Z +∞
t
d(T )φ0
µZ T
0
α(τ)u(c(τ))dτ
¶
dT = λs(t)e−rt (8)
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier.
Taking the logarithmic derivative and using d(t) = −s0(t), one obtains:
Lemma 1 The optimal consumption profile is such that ‘∀t > 0:
c0(t)
c(t)
= σ(c(t))
⎡
⎣r + α
0(t)
α(t)
− s
0(t)
s(t)
−
s0(t)φ0
³R T
0
α(τ)u(c(τ))dτ
´
R +∞
t s
0(T )φ0
³R T
0
α(τ)u(c(τ))dτ
´
⎤
⎦
where σ(c) = − u0(c)cu00(c) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
An immediate consequence is:
Corollary 1 When φ is linear, the optimal consumption profile is such that ‘∀t >
0:
c0(t)
c(t)
= σ(c(t))
∙
r +
α0(t)
α(t)
¸
In particular, in the case where intertemporal elasticity of substitution is
constant, the consumption growth rate is independent of the mortality pattern,
as has been known since Yaari (1965). In such a case, an explicit solution can be
given to the consumption problem:
cyaari(t) = Kec(t) with ec(t) = α(t)σerσt and K = R +∞0 s(t)y(t)e−rtdtR +∞
0
s(t)ec(t)e−rtdt (9)
When φ is not linear, however, equation (8) does not provide an explicit solu-
tion to the consumer problem, since the right hand side of the equality depends
on consumption. Still, it does suggest a fairly simple way to derive the optimum
consumption profile through a simple iterative process, especially when σ(c) the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is constant (which is assumed hereafter).
At stage 1, start with an arbitrary consumption profile c0. Then, iteratively
compute c1, c2, c3, etc. with the recursive formula:
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cn(t) = Knecn(t)
with ecn(t) = α(t)σerσt ∙Z +∞
t
s0(T )
s(t)
φ0
µZ T
0
α(τ)u(cn−1(τ))dτ
¶¸σ
and Kn =
R +∞
0
s(t)y(t)e−rtdtR +∞
0
s(t)ecn(t)e−rtdt
The iterative process involves firstly computing what would be the discount func-
tion, if the consumption profile was exogenously given by cn−1; secondly, deter-
mining the consumption profile cn that maximizes expected utility, given that
discount function. It is formally shown in Bommier (2008) that when the concav-
ity of φ is small enough, that iterative process converges towards the optimum
consumption profile as n→ +∞. In practice this procedure is extremely efficient
when numerically implemented, convergence being extremely quick, typically ob-
tained in a fraction of second.
It is also possible to derive analytic but approximate solutions by considering
the case where the difference in welfare between life and death is much larger
than the difference between high and low of consumption (that is when the value
of life is extremely large). The strategy first involves determining a plausible
range [cmin, cmax] for the levels of instantaneous consumption, picking an arbitrary
reference level c∗ ∈ [cmin, cmax] and writing:
u(c) = u(c∗)[1 + εv(c)]
with ε = u(cmax)−u(cmin)u(c∗) , v(c) =
u(c)−u(c∗)
u(cmax)−u(cmin) . Then, an approximation can be
obtained by assuming that ε << 1 or, in other words that the difference in in-
stantaneous utility between consuming cmax or consuming cmin is much smaller
than the difference between consuming c∗ or being dead. The idea is to approxi-
mate the expected utility function (3) by a first order approximation in ε. From
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(3) one obtains
EU(c) ' u(c∗)
Z +∞
0
s(t)α(t)φ0
µ
u(c∗)
Z t
0
α(τ)dτ
¶
dt
+εu(c∗)
Z +∞
0
s(t)v(c(t))α(t)φ0
µ
u(c∗)
Z t
0
α(τ)dτ
¶
dt
+ε [u(c∗)]2
Z +∞
0
s(t)α(t)
µZ t
0
α(τ 1)v(c(τ 1))dτ 1
¶
φ00
µ
u(c∗)
Z t
0
α(τ)dτ
¶
dt
After a few operations (a switch in integration order and an integration by parts
in the third term) one obtains:
EU(c) ' u(c∗)
Z +∞
0
s(t)α(t)φ0
µ
u(c∗)
Z t
0
α(τ)dτ
¶
dt+εu(c∗)
Z +∞
0
s(t)β(t)v(c(t))dt
(10)
where β(t) is given by
β(t) =
α(t)
s(t)
Z +∞
t
d(τ)φ0
µ
u(c∗)
Z τ
0
α(τ 1)dτ 1
¶
dτ (11)
When mortality is exogenous, the first term of the right hand side of (10) is a
constant and therefore does not affect individuals’ choice. Agents, behave then
as if they were maximizing:
EU lin app =
Z +∞
0
s(t)β(t)v(c(t))dt
an additive utility function with the discount function β(t) given by (11). This
problem is of the same nature as the one obtained when φ is linear. The solution
is given by
clin app(t) = Kec(t)
with ec(t) = α(t)σerσt ∙ 1
s(t)
Z +∞
t
d(T )φ0
µ
u(c∗)
Z T
0
α(τ)dτ
¶¸σ
and K =
R +∞
0
s(t)y(t)e−rtdtR +∞
0
s(t)ec(t)e−rtdt
It is easy to check that this approximate solution coincides with the exact one
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given in (9) in the case where φ is linear. Moreover clin app corresponds to c1,
which is obtained in the first step of the iterative process described above, when
c0 is taken constant and equal to c∗.
When φ is not linear, a noteworthy feature of the exact or approximate solu-
tions is that the shape of the consumption profile depends on the survival function.
In fact, the consumption growth rate at a given age depends on the mortality rate
at that age and also on mortality rates at greater ages. From Lemma 1, we can
see that the mortality rate at age t tends to decrease the consumption growth
rate at age t while mortality rates at age greater than t have the opposite impact.
The reasons for these opposing effects of mortality on the consumption growth
rate are discussed in Bommier (2008). Basically, at age t, mortality involves a
potential loss, whose likelihood of occurrence is positively related to the mortality
rate at age t but whose magnitude (roughly speaking, remaining life expectancy)
is negatively related to mortality rates at greater ages.
3 Aggregate wealth
Consider now a population composed of individuals of different ages. More pre-
cisely, denote by N(x) the density of individuals of age x, so that there are
N(x)dx individuals of age between x and x + dx in the population, the whole
population size being normalized to 1. In the case of a steady-state population,
N(x) would be proportional to e−nxs(x) where n is the population growth rate.
Still, in order to be able to consider realistic demographic data on population age
structure, we do not make such an assumption. In what follows N(x) can be any
distribution with compact support.
From (4) and (5) we can compute individual’s wealth at age x :
w(x) =
1
s(x)
Z +∞
x
s(t)e−r(t−x)(c(t)− y(t))dt
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The aggregate wealth in the population is:
W =
Z +∞
0
N(x)w(x)dx =
Z +∞
0
dx
Z +∞
x
N(x)erx
s(x)
s(t)e−rt(c(t)− y(t))dt
After a switch in integration order, we get:
W =
Z +∞
0
ΩN,s(t)(c(t)− y(t))dt (12)
with
ΩN,s(t) =
Z t
0
s(t)
s(x)
N(x)er(x−t)dx
Note that ΩN,s(.) is a function that depends on survival probabilities and popula-
tion age structure, but which is independent of individual preferences and budget
constraints. ΩN,s(.) can therefore be computed from demographic data alone. As
we will see in Section 3.1 below, equation (12) then proves to be quite practi-
cal to compute and discuss the determinants of aggregate wealth accumulation,
disentangling what is due to purely demographic factors from what is related to
saving behaviors.
The ratio of aggregate wealth over aggregate income is:
W
Y
=
R +∞
0
ΩN,s(t)(c(t)− y(t))dtR +∞
0
N(t)y(t)dt
(13)
This is the variable on which we will focus in order to assess the impact of
mortality decline. The choice to focus on W/Y rather than on W was guided
by the fact that in the case where aggregate capital equals aggregate wealth (no
asset bubbles or capital owned by foreigners), the ratio WY equals the capital/labor
income ratio.
3.1 Impact of mortality changes
Compare now two demographic states A and B which are characterized by dif-
ferent survival functions (sA and sB) and different population structures (NA
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and NB). We consider a partial equilibrium (or a small open economy), so that
wealth accumulation have no effect on labor income and the rate of interest. We
denote by r and y(.) the rate of interest and age specific income profile which,
by assumptions, are the same in states A and B. We denote by WAYA and
WB
YB
the
ratio of aggregate wealth over aggregate income in states A and B. Using (13),
we may break down the variation of this ratio into three terms:
WB
YB
− WA
YA
= I1 + I2 + I3
with
I1 =
R +∞
0
ΩNB ,sA(t)(cA(t)− y(t))dtR +∞
0
NB(t)y(t)dt
−
R +∞
0
ΩNA,sA(t)(cA(t)− y(t))dtR +∞
0
NA(t)y(t)dt
I2 =
R +∞
0
( bcA(t)− y(t))ΩNB ,sB(t)dtR +∞
0
NB(t)y(t)dt
−
R +∞
0
(cA(t)− y(t))ΩNB ,sA)dtR +∞
0
NB(t)y(t)dt
I3 =
R +∞
0
ΩNB ,sB(t) (cB(t)− bcA(t)) dtR +∞
0
NB(t)y(t)dt
where bcA(t) = κcA(t) with κ = R +∞0 sB(t)y(t)e−rtdtR +∞
0
sB(t)cAe−rtdt
The first term, I1, is an aggregating effect. It shows how the ratio of aggregate
wealth over aggregate income would have shifted, if the only factor to change was
the population age structure. The second, I2, shows how WY would have changed
if the only consequence of longevity extension was a shift from consumption cA
to bcA, that is a simple rescaling of individual consumption in order to match the
new budget constraint. This terms therefore represents an income dilution effect
associated with the fact that, when longevity increases, agents have to lower their
instantaneous consumption in order to cover a greater life duration. The last term
is an impatience effect: it measures the consequences of the changes in the shape
of the life cycle consumption profiles following a change in mortality rates. This
term equals zero, according to Yaari’s model, but this is no longer the case when
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temporal risk aversion is introduced.
4 Applications
We illustrate the above framework using realistic demographic data provided by
the Human Mortality Database, covering the second half of the twentieth century
for twenty-two countries2. These data gather life tables as well as accurate data
on the population age structure. It is thus possible to implement the above
computation with accuracy.
4.1 Demographic facts
Tables 1 and 2 provide information on mortality for all twenty-two countries.
As mortality at young and old ages may play different roles, we reported infor-
mation on adulthood and old age mortality. More precisely, Table 1 provides
life expectancies at ages 20 and 60, when computed according to the 1950 and
2000 life tables. Table 2 respectively reports 30q50 and 70q80 the mortality ratios
between ages 30 and 50 and between ages 70 and 80 according to the same life
tables. For all countries but Bulgaria, all these indicators unanimously indicate
a decline in mortality between years 1950-2000. This corresponds to the well
documented trend of longevity extension that has been observed in developed
countries. The decline is substantial on average, but the data report quite sig-
nificant variations. At the bottom-end we find countries like Bulgaria, where
mortality has hardly declined (this is mainly due to a deterioration in the last
two decades of the century) or, more surprisingly, a country like Denmark, where
mortality did decline, but relatively little compared to what happened in other
countries. At the other extreme we find Japan, which is characterized by a huge
decline in mortality. The fall is particularly spectacular for middle aged adults,
since 30q50 , the mortality ratio between ages 30 and 50, was almost divided by
2Country selection was determined by data availability. More precisely, we considered all
countries for which the Human Mortality Database provided 1950 and 2000 life tables.
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5 between 1950 and 2000. As a consequence, Japan that initially had the lowest
life expectancy at age 20 (and the greatest 30q50) in 1950 became the country of
our dataset with the greatest life expectancy (and the lowest 30q50) in 2000.
Table 3 reports data on population age structure. More precisely, what are
shown are the "elderly ratios" that were observed in years 1950 and 2000. By
"elderly ratio", we mean the ratio of the population of age greater than 60 to the
ratio of the population of age 20-60. In all countries, the elderly ratio increased
between 1950 and 2000. However, mortality is just one determinant of this elderly
ratio, which also depends on past birth rate and on migration. As a result, the
pattern that arises from Table 3, with respect to the elderly ratio, does not closely
replicate the patterns found in Tables 1 and 2 relating to mortality. Japan, which
was characterized by a huge mortality decline is characterized by a huge increase
of the elderly ratio (+148%). But a comparable increase (+122%) is also found
in Bulgaria, although there were only minor mortality changes in that country.
Meanwhile, the elderly ratio only changed slightly in New Zealand, although
mortality did substantially decline.
4.2 Assumptions and model calibration
In order to implement the method developed in section 3, we make a list of
simplifying assumptions that we detail below.
4.2.1 Institutional and demographic assumptions
The aim of this paper is to illustrate the potential role of mortality decline but
definitely not to provide an accurate and complex representation of what may
have been going on in the countries studied. For our objective, we thought it to
be more judicious to stick to a stylized representation of reality, rather than using
a complex model based on assumptions that would have to be country-specific
in order to account for the variety of institutional settings. Thus, we focused
on demographic heterogeneity, and deliberately decided to ignore all other (eco-
nomic, cultural, etc.) aspects that may differ between countries or that may have
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changed between 1950 and 2000. In order to avoid confusing over-interpretation
of the results, one should simply consider that country names such as “Australia”
or “Denmark” that appear in the discussion and tables that follow, do not refer
to actual countries with specific institutions, but simply to different patterns of
demographic changes.
We assume that, as far as savings are concerned, individuals’ economic life
begins at age 20. In other words, individuals do not save before that age. Such
an assumption can be viewed as corresponding to the case where children have
stringent liquidity constraints that compel them to consume all they receive from
their parents until they reach age 20.
Labor income is supposed to be exogenous, constant up to age 60, and equalling
zero afterwards. We therefore rule out the existence of Social Security systems
as well as the endogeneity of retirement age. Social Security and retirement reg-
ulations being extremely heterogenous across countries, it would have been quite
hazardous to suggest a universal model that would have covered all the countries
under consideration. Age specific variations in productivity are also ignored.
The rate of interest is assumed to be exogenous and equal to 3%. Of course,
this may be open to discussion, especially when encountering changes in aggregate
wealth of substantial magnitude. In a close economy, an increase of accumulated
wealth should push down the rate of interest: such a general equilibrium adjust-
ment is not taken into account in our illustrations.
As for demographic data, we consider cross-sectional agents, and imagine so-
cieties where agents would live according to these cross-sectional mortality rates.
This is of course a thought experiment since cross-sectional mortality data do
not reflect longitudinal mortality data. A 50 year old agent alive in year 2000
did not face the 2000 mortality rates in his youth, and certainly does not expect
to face these same 2000 rates in the future. The use of historical cross-sectional
mortality data does not aim therefore at reproducing the life of real agents, but
simply at providing demographic patterns that are fairly reasonable.
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4.2.2 Model calibration
The papers aims at emphasizing the role of temporal risk aversion when studying
the relation between mortality and aggregate wealth accumulation. A possibility
would be to look at the role played by the function φ keeping everything else
constant. But when changing the function φ, while keeping other parameters
constant, one also changes the rate of time discounting. With such a strategy, it
is then difficult to conclude whether what is emphasized is the role of temporal risk
aversion or that of human impatience. The other possibility, that is pursued of
the paper, is to consider different combination for the functions φ and α providing
identical rates of time discounting (for a reference mortality pattern) and see what
happens when mortality is changed. The idea, for proceeding in such a way, is
to consider that the empirical literature does provide us with some information
on the shape of age-specific consumption profiles but that this can be explained
by different combinations of the functions φ and α, with different implications
regarding the impact of mortality decline.
For simplicity sake, the results will be presented for only two specifications
of individual preferences suggesting two orthogonal explanations to human impa-
tience. The first, called the "additive model" assumes that agents are temporally
risk neutral (φ is linear). This specification was suggested by Yaari (1965), and
is now found in almost all economic papers that discuss the impact of mortality
decline. In that case, human impatience is almost exogenous (mortality playing
a minor role), and is governed by the shape of the subjective discount function α.
The second specification, called the “time neutral model”, assumes that agents
have no pure time preferences (α is constant) but are temporally risk averse.
According to the time neutral model, agents’ impatience exclusively results from
lifetime uncertainty, whose impact is magnified by temporal risk aversion. The
additive and the time neutral models can be viewed as polar cases in the set of
possible explanations for human impatience. Intermediate positions where human
impatience would result both from pure time preferences and from temporal risk
aversion would involve choosing a specification with both a decreasing function
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α and a concave function φ. Results obtained with such intermediate specifica-
tions typically fall in between those of the additive and time neutral cases and
are not reported in the present paper.
In both specifications, we assume that the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution is constant and relatively close to one, consistent with the results of
empirical studies such as Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1994). To avoid hav-
ing to deal with the limit case where this elasticity equals 1 and instantaneous
utility is logarithmic we took an intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to
0.9. We then have u(c) = 1 + λ1−γ c
1−γ
1−γ with γ =
1
0.9 , where λ is a constant.
The constant λ (which matters as soon as temporal risk aversion is taken into
account) is what determines the value of life. Now, u(c) can obviously be rewrit-
ten as u(c) = 1 + (λc)
1−γ
1−γ which makes it clear that changing λ is equivalent to
choosing the consumption measurement scale. There are therefore two possible
strategies at the calibration stage: either choose an arbitrary λ and calibrate
the measurement scale of the income profile y(.) (which is what indirectly deter-
mines the consumption level) in order to obtain values of statistical lives that are
reasonable; or choose an arbitrary income profile y(.) and then calibrate λ. We
followed this latter approach. Calibration was performed so that with r = 3%
and with 1950 US mortality rates, the value of a statistical life of a 40 year old
individual is about 250 times its annual income. A 40 year old individual earning
20,000 dollars per year would then have a value of statistical life of about 5 mil-
lion dollars, in the range of what is suggested by empirical estimates derived from
US data (see Viscusi and Aldy 2004). There is of course some possible dispute
about taking 5 million dollar for the value of a statistical life, since empirical
studies provide a broad range of estimates. However, we shall emphasize that
our results are not very sensitive to that assumption. In particular, the additive
approximation, which involves assuming an infinite value for the value of a sta-
tistical life provides quite similar results. In fact, as soon as we assume a value
of statistical life that is significantly larger than remaining lifetime consumption
(which is what is typically reported by empirical studies), we are not far from the
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limit case where the value of life is infinite, and the choice of a particular value
has little importance.
In order to have models that are reasonably comparable, we chose the function
α in the additive model and the function φ in the time neutral model, so that
both models would predict a fairly close pattern of consumption smoothing. More
precisely, in the time neutral specification, the function φ is given by:
φ(x) =
1− e−kx
k
assuming therefore constant absolute risk aversion with respect to life duration.
The value of k has been chosen so that we obtain a reasonable inverse U-shape
consumption profile, qualitatively similar to what is found in empirical studies
such as Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2007), when r = 3% and mortality
corresponds to that of the 1950 US life table. This consumption profile is shown
in Figure 2. To get an order of magnitude of the degree of temporal risk aversion
associated with such a specification, one may consider the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion with respect to life duration when considering constant consumption
profiles. We found a coefficient of 0.76 % per year, when using the constant
consumption profile that satisfies the budget constraint. With this degree of risk
aversion, individuals would be indifferent between (i) living 73.1 years for sure
and (ii) having 50 percent chances to live 65 years and 50 percent chances to live
85 years.
As for the additive model, the function α is chosen so that both models give
exactly the same optimal consumption profile when mortality rates are those of
the 1950 US life table. Thus, by construction, both the additive and multiplica-
tive models provide the same prediction on wealth accumulation when using the
mortality pattern observed in 1950 in the USA. The differences obtained when
looking at the impact of mortality decline are therefore not the consequences of di-
verging beliefs about the strength of human impatience but result from diverging
views on the causes of human impatience.
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4.3 The ratio of aggregate wealth over aggregate income
For each of the twenty-two countries, we computed the (theoretical) ratio of ag-
gregate wealth over aggregate incomeW/Y , using either the additive or the time
neutral model of individual preferences. We also computed the results obtained
with the linear approximation of the time neutral model detailed in Section 2.2.
Results are reported in Table 4. The first two columns give the ratio in year 1950
and 2000. The third column, computes the relative increase. This latter is then
broken down into three components, representing aggregating, income dilution
and behavioral effects, respectively. For example, in Australia, according to the
time neutral model, the ratio of aggregate wealth over aggregate (yearly) income
would have been 5 in 1950 and 6.81 in year 2000 (columns 1 and 2). It would
thus have increased by 62.4% (column 3). Out of these 62.4%, there are 8.3 per-
centage points that come from the aggregating effect (and hence from the change
in population age structure), 27.9 from the income dilution effect, and 28.1 from
the behavioral effect (columns 4, 5 and 6).
For all countries, the ratio of aggregate wealth over aggregate income is found
to be greater in year 2000 than in year 1950. But results significantly differ
depending on the countries and the model assumed.
The additive model constrains the behavioral effect to equal zero since the
shape of the optimal consumption profile cyaari is independent of mortality rates.
The time neutral model, which introduces a link between mortality and impa-
tience generates a behavioral effect, which is anything but negligible. In all coun-
tries but Bulgaria and Hungary, this behavioral effect happens to be the largest
of the three reported effects. In most cases, its size is comparable to the sum of
the other two effects, indicating that accounting for this behavioral effect would
be as important as taking into account the other aspects together. Quantitatively
speaking, the standard approach based on the additive model, which focuses on
the aggregating and income dilution effects, might have led half of the story to be
forgotten. This sometimes amounts to more, as in Japan and Spain, sometimes
to less, as in Denmark and the Netherlands, but in all cases it represents a non
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negligible part.
The strongest behavioral effect is found in Japan, the country where the most
important decline of mortality was observed. It is clear that in such a case
the predicted increase in aggregate wealth is so large that our assumption of
a constant rate of interest becomes problematic. In general equilibrium, with
an endogenous rate of interest, one would find a significant decrease in the rate
of interest and a smaller increase in wealth accumulation. Thus, the numbers
provided in Table 4 should not be directly compared to what was observed in
Japan during the same period. Still, it is interesting to mention that the interest
rate has strongly fallen in Japan during the second half of the twentieth century
(see for example Braun, Ikeda and Joines, 2006) as would predict our model in
a general equilibrium. Our paper highlights therefore another channel through
which demographic evolutions may end having an impact on savings and wealth
accumulation in Japan, adding to those highlighted in Horioka, Suzuki and Hatta
(2007).
One important point is that the behavioral effect cannot be assessed correctly
without looking at the age-specific changes in mortality. Bulgaria provides an
interesting example. In that country, life expectancy at age 20 was roughly at
the same level in years 1950 and 2000. Still, the behavioral effect is found to be
substantial. In fact, the stagnation of life expectancy in Bulgaria results from
the combination of a decrease of mortality at young ages and an increase at old
ages (see Table 1). Although the mean age at death did not radically change,
the distribution did change quite a lot, inducing changes in impatience. This
therefore provides an example where characterizing mortality by life expectancy
(as is often done in empirical studies) may be a poor strategy.
The last point worth noticing in Table 4 is that linear approximation of the
time neutral model does a reasonably good job. The predicted levels forW/Y are
slightly different when using the linear approximation than when using the time
neutral model itself. But, when looking at the impact of mortality changes, the
linear approximation provides results that are close to the true ones. For example,
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in the USA the time neutral model predicts an increase of 54.2% for W/Y when
going from 1950 to 2000 mortality rates. According to the linear approximation
we would have found a pretty close result, with a predicted increase of 54.8%. In
other words, the linear approximation does introduce a small bias, but this bias
is found to be nearly steady and therefore to vanish when looking at differences.
5 Discussion
The paper discussed the impact of longevity extension on aggregate wealth ac-
cumulation. It has highlighted the potential role of an aspect of individual pref-
erences that has hitherto been ignored: that of temporal risk aversion. When
temporal risk aversion is introduced, a novel interesting relation emerges linking
mortality and time discounting. Mortality changes may then lead individuals
to significantly modify their saving behaviors, with sizable consequences on the
aggregate wealth.
Illustrations based on historical mortality data show that accounting for tem-
poral risk aversion may radically change predictions about the impact of decline
in mortality. Firstly, extension of longevity may have had a much greater impact
than is usually thought. Secondly, the impact has to be evaluated by carefully
looking at the changes in the whole distribution of the age at death, and not by
using a single synthetic indicator, such as life expectancy. For a given increase in
life expectancy, radically different results may be obtained depending on whether
this increase in life expectancy is due to a fall in mortality at young or old ages.
Our results naturally raise a burning issue: to what extent are humans tem-
porally risk averse? Could it be the case that human impatience, which is usually
taken as being mostly exogenous and independent of risk aversion, is in fact en-
dogenous, closely related to mortality rates and risk aversion? Are individuals
closer to the additive formulation than to the time neutral model? Answering
these questions is crucial to understand the impact of decline in mortality.
These issues are discussed in greater length in Bommier (2008), where it is
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shown that up to now, there is no evidence that would suggest the superiority
of the additive specification over the time neutral one. Indeed, as long as het-
erogeneity in mortality is not considered, the time neutral model can reproduce
all the predictions of the additive model. Consequently, most empirical evidence
that provided the additive formulation with some credibility, is in fact unable
to discriminate between the time neutral and the additive models. Moreover,
considerations about observed heterogeneity in time preference between men and
women, or between individuals from different socioeconomic groups, would actu-
ally argue in favor of a strong link between mortality and impatience and therefore
against the additive formulation.
The economic literature has therefore focused on the model assuming tem-
poral risk neutrality, while alternative specifications, with at least as much em-
pirical support, would lead to radically different conclusions. There is no doubt
that, technically speaking, assuming temporal risk neutrality is a very convenient
choice. In that case, individuals’ expected utilities are additively separable and
analytic computation is fairly simple. The temptation to focus on the additive
model is fairly understandable. But is this a reasonable choice? A few lines writ-
ten by George Stigler, although dating back to 1950 are amazingly topical. In a
discussion about preferences over several goods, Stigler wrote:
"Manageability, should mean the ability to bring the theory to bear on specific
economic problems, not ease of manipulation. The economist, has no right to
expect of the universe he explores that its laws are discoverable by the indolent
and the unlearned. The faithful adherence for so long to the additive utility
function strikes one as showing at least a lack of enterprise. I think it showed
also a lack of imagination: no economic problem has only one avenue of approach"
(Stigler, 1950, p394).
The same statement holds for the analysis of intertemporal choice under un-
certain lifetime: the faithful adherence to the additive utility function is no less
questionable. Just as risk aversion plays a key role in Finance, temporal risk
aversion is likely to become a central element in the economics of aging. Death
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is an event with long-lasting consequences; the rational response to the risk of
death has thus to crucially depend on temporal risk aversion.
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Table 1: Changes in life expectancy
Country Life expectancy at age 20 Life expectancy at age 60
in year in year Variation in year in year Variation
1950 2000 1950-2000 1950 2000 1950-2000
Australia 52.4 61.3 16.9 % 17.4 24.0 38.0 %
Austria 51.5 59.5 15.7 % 17.0 22.6 33.1 %
Belgium 51.6 59.1 14.5 % 17.2 22.5 30.6 %
Bulgaria 52.0 53.6 3.2 % 18.4 18.2 -1 %
Canada 53.0 60.6 14.4 % 18.0 23.4 29.7 %
Czech 50.9 56.2 10.5 % 16.4 19.9 21.2%
Denmark 53.9 58.1 7.8 % 18.0 21.2 18.2 %
England 52.5 59.5 13.2 % 17.3 22.2 28.8 %
Finland 49.1 58.8 19.8 % 15.9 22.3 40.1 %
France 51.8 60.4 16.7 % 17.5 23.9 36.5 %
Hungary 50.5 53.2 5.3 % 16.9 18.8 10.9 %
Iceland 54.3 60.8 12.0 % 19.5 23.4 20.0 %
Italy 52.8 60.9 15.3 % 18 23.4 30.4%
Japan 47.0 62.4 32.7 % 15.8 24.9 58.1%
Netherlands 54.9 59.6 8.7 % 18.6 22.2 19.5 %
New Zealand 53.0 60.3 13.7 % 17.9 23.2 30.0 %
Norway 55.3 59.9 8.4 % 19.2 22.7 18.1 %
Slovakia 51.0 54.7 7.2 % 17.2 18.9 9.6 %
Spain 50.6 60.5 19.7 % 17.4 23.5 34.7%
Sweden 54.0 60.8 12.6 % 18.1 23.2 28.1 %
Switzerland 52.8 61.2 16.0 % 17.6 23.8 35.6 %
USA 51.9 58.6 13.0 % 17.7 22.3 26.3 %
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Table 2: Changes in mortality rates
Country Mortality between 30 and 50 (%) Mortality between 70 and 80 (%)
in year in year Ratio in year in year Ratio
1950 2000 1950/2000 1950 2000 1950/2000
Australia 6.3 2.8 2.25 50.9 25.9 1.97
Austria 7.2 3.2 2.25 52.7 29.5 1.79
Belgium 7.3 3.6 2.05 51.4 30 1.72
Bulgaria 7.7 5.9 1.3 48.3 46.9 1.03
Canada 6.4 2.8 2.32 47.2 27.8 1.7
Czech 7.3 4.2 1.74 55.6 39.3 1.41
Denmark 5.3 3.5 1.5 49.1 35 1.4
England 6 3 2 51.5 32 1.61
Finland 9.1 4 2.28 57.4 30.4 1.88
France 7.8 4 1.95 49.9 24.7 2.02
Hungary 8.5 8 1.06 52.5 42.8 1.23
Iceland 7.4 2.5 2.98 41.9 27 1.55
Italy 6.7 2.6 2.6 49.1 27.3 1.8
Japan 12.2 2.5 4.83 57 22.8 2.5
Netherlands 4.4 2.7 1.63 46.5 30.9 1.5
New Zealand 6 2.9 2.04 49.1 28.3 1.74
Norway 4.8 2.9 1.64 43.7 29.3 1.49
Slovakia 7.9 5.2 1.52 51.8 42.9 1.21
Spain 9 3.3 2.74 51.2 26.9 1.9
Sweden 5 2.4 2.13 48.4 27.4 1.77
Switzerland 6.1 2.6 2.35 50.4 25.1 2.01
USA 7.7 4.2 1.83 48.2 30.9 1.56
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Table 3: Changes in population age structure
Country Elderly Ratio
in year in year Variation
1950 2000 1950-2000
Australia 0.23 0.30 27.9 %
Austria 0.28 0.35 27.6 %
Belgium 0.28 0.4 41.6 %
Bulgaria 0.18 0.40 122.1 %
Canada 0.22 0.29 31.2 %
Czech 0.22 0.31 41.4 %
Denmark 0.25 0.35 41.5 %
England 0.28 0.39 37.1 %
Finland 0.19 0.36 84.1 %
France 0.30 0.38 26.3 %
Hungary 0.21 0.35 62.2 %
Iceland 0.22 0.28 29.2 %
Italy 0.23 0.43 87.9 %
Japan 0.17 0.41 148.4 %
Netherlands 0.22 0.32 42.0 %
New Zealand 0.26 0.29 10.1 %
Norway 0.24 0.35 44.6 %
Slovakia 0.19 0.27 44.1 %
Spain 0.2.0 0.38 87.3 %
Sweden 0.26 0.41 56.1 %
Switzerland 0.25 0.36 42.4 %
USA 0.22 0.30 32.0 %
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Table 4: Ratio of aggregate wealth other aggregate income
1 2 3 4 5 6
Country + model W/Y W/Y
in year in year Variation Aggreg. Dilution Behav.
1950 2000 1950-2000 Effect Effect Effect
Australia additive 5.00 6.81 36.3 % 8.5 % 27.9 % 0.0 %
Australia time neutral 5.49 8.92 62.4 % 8.3 % 26.0 % 28.1 %
Australia t.n. (lin. app.) 6.08 9.89 62.6 % 8.0 % 23.8 % 30.9 %
Austria additive 5.56 7.05 26.7 % 3.2 % 23.5 % 0.0 %
Austria time neutral 5.69 9.2 61.7 % 3.0 % 23.6 % 35.2 %
Austria t.n. (lin. app.) 6.26 10.18 62.6 % 2.7 % 21.6 % 38.3 %
Belgium additive 5.54 7.41 33.7 % 10.2 % 23.5 % 0.0 %
Belgium time neutral 5.63 9.32 65.5 % 10.3 % 23.7 % 31.6 %
Belgium t.n. (lin. app.) 6.17 10.27 66.5 % 9.8 % 21.7 % 35.0 %
Bulgaria additive 4.60 6.56 42.4 % 44.5 % -2.0 % 0.0 %
Bulgaria time neutral 3.87 7.51 94.2 % 54.0 % -1.9 % 42.1 %
Bulgaria t.n. (lin. app.) 4.12 8.25 100.3 % 51.0 % -1.6 % 50.9 %
Canada additive 4.88 6.7 37.5 % 14.4 % 23.1 % 0.0 %
Canada time neutral 5.28 9.02 70.8 % 14.3 % 22.1 % 34.4 %
Canada t.n. (lin. app.) 5.82 9.99 71.6 % 13.9 % 20.3 % 37.5 %
Czech additive 4.88 6.22 27.4 % 10.7 % 16.7 % 0.0 %
Czech time neutral 4.93 7.80 58.3 % 11.0 % 16.9 % 30.4 %
Czech t.n. (lin. app.) 5.48 8.61 57.1 % 10.1 % 15.4 % 31.6 %
Denmark additive 5.36 6.83 27.3 % 13 % 14.3 % 0.0 %
Denmark time neutral 6.38 8.88 39.2 % 12.4 % 13.1 % 13.7 %
Denmark t.n. (lin. app.) 7.14 9.79 37.1 % 11.9 % 12.1 % 13.0 %
England additive 5.52 7.22 30.8 % 8.9 % 21.9 % 0.0 %
England time neutral 6.18 9.63 55.9 % 8.5 % 20.4 % 27 %
England t.n. (lin. app.) 6.86 10.67 55.5 % 8 % 18.8 % 28.7 %
Finland additive 4.38 7.29 66.6 % 30.1 % 36.5 % 0.0 %
Finland time neutral 3.72 8.98 141.2 % 34.7 % 42.4 % 64.1 %
Finland t.n. (lin. app.) 4.09 9.88 141.8 % 32.2 % 38.0 % 71.6 %
France additive 5.70 7.48 31.2 % 5.2 % 26 % 0.0 %
France time neutral 5.61 9.06 61.5 % 5.2 % 27.1 % 29.3 %
France t.n. (lin. app.) 6.09 9.84 61.8 % 5.0 % 24.8 % 32 %
Hungary additive 4.85 6.17 27.2 % 18.5 % 8.7 % 0.0 %
Hungary time neutral 4.34 6.44 48.1 % 20.9 % 9.9 % 17.4 %
Hungary t.n. (lin. app.) 4.72 6.84 44.9 % 19.4 % 8.9 % 16.6 %
(continued)
30
Table 4: (continued)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Country + model W/Y W/Y
in year in year Variation Aggreg. Dilution Behav.
1950 2000 1950-2000 Effect Effect Effect
Iceland additive 5.13 6.39 24.5 % 10.1 % 14.4 % 0.0 %
Iceland time neutral 4.93 8.76 77.5 % 10.7 % 16 % 50.8 %
Iceland t.n. (lin. app.) 5.29 9.75 84.4 % 10.3 % 14.9 % 59.2 %
Italy additive 5.03 7.80 55.1 % 28.5 % 26.6 % 0.0 %
Italy time neutral 5.20 10.58 103.4 % 29.3 % 27.2 % 46.9 %
Italy t.n. (lin. app.) 5.74 11.75 104.5 % 27.9 % 24.9 % 51.8 %
Japan additive 3.93 8.32 111.5 % 53.3 % 58.2 % 0.0 %
Japan time neutral 2.35 11.23 378.7 % 81.7 % 94.3 % 202.7 %
Japan t.n. (lin. app.) 2.38 12.39 419.6 % 77.6 % 86.4 % 255.6 %
Netherlands additive 5.16 6.75 30.9 % 15.6 % 15.3 % 0.0 %
Netherlands time neutral 6.41 9.46 47.6 % 15 % 13.7 % 18.9 %
Netherlands t.n. (lin. app.) 7.19 10.53 46.6 % 14.7 % 12.8 % 19.1 %
New Zealand additive 5.27 6.56 24.4 % 3.3 % 21.1 % 0.0 %
New Zealand time neutral 5.80 8.52 46.8 % 3.4 % 20.1 % 23.3 %
New Zealand t.n. (lin. app.) 6.42 9.42 46.8 % 3.3 % 18.4 % 25 %
Norway additive 5.51 6.94 26.1 % 12.2 % 13.9 % 0.0 %
Norway time neutral 6.53 9.22 41.2 % 12.0 % 13.1 % 16.1 %
Norway t.n. (lin. app.) 7.28 10.27 41.0 % 11.6 % 12.2 % 17.2 %
Slovakia additive 4.55 5.52 21.5 % 13.8 % 7.8 % 0.0 %
Slovakia time neutral 4.09 6.61 61.5 % 15.5 % 9.0 % 36.9 %
Slovakia t.n. (lin. app.) 4.47 7.27 62.5 % 14.6 % 8.1 % 39.8 %
Spain additive 4.63 7.18 55.1 % 26.0 % 29.1 % 0.0 %
Spain time neutral 3.73 9.25 148.2 % 31.1 % 36.6 % 80.5 %
Spain t.n. (lin. app.) 3.95 10.22 159 % 29.2 % 33.5 % 96.3 %
Sweden additive 5.57 7.71 38.6 % 16.2 % 22.4 % 0.0 %
Sweden time neutral 6.60 10.87 64.8 % 15.6 % 20.6 % 28.6 %
Sweden t.n. (lin. app.) 7.38 12.1 63.9 % 14.9 % 19.1 % 29.9 %
Switzerland additive 5.34 7.41 38.9 % 12.0 % 26.9 % 0.0 %
Switzerland time neutral 5.89 10.01 70.0 % 11.7 % 25.7 % 32.6 %
Switzerland t.n. (lin. app.) 6.54 11.12 70.1 % 11.2 % 23.6 % 35.3 %
USA additive 4.97 6.44 29.5 % 9.1 % 20.4 % 0.0 %
USA time neutral 4.97 7.66 54.2 % 9.1 % 20.4 % 24.7 %
USA t.n. (lin. app.) 5.39 8.35 54.8 % 8.6 % 18.6 % 27.6 %
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Figure 1: Lottery 1 and lottery 2 provide the same utility under temporal risk 
neutrality. Lottery 2 is preferred under temporal risk aversion.   
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Figure 2: Consumption Profile Used at Calibration Stage
